Race disturbances
Brick Lane (1978), Bradford, Liverpool, Brixton
(1981), Handsworth (1985)
Reference: Kenneth Leech Struggle in Babylon (Sheldon Press 1988)
Brick Lane 1978
Kenneth
Leech writes:
"The second wave of violence (after Notting Hill) occurred in the Brick lane
area of of Spitalfields and Bethnal Green in East London in 1978. I was parish
priest of the northern parts of Brisk Lane at the time, and my church was
a few minutes walk from the scenes of the worst violence - directed principally
against the Asian community, almost all of whom came from Bangladesh. The
assailants were mainly white 'skinhead' youths, inspired by the National Front,
the British Movement, Column 88 and other fascist groups. The term
'Paki-bashing' had first been used in the Bethnal Green area in 1969-70, and
there had been a history pf attacks thereafter."
between May and September 1978 there were several murders, many violent incidents against persons and property, and on 11 June 1978, a mob of several hundred skinheads rampaged through Brick Lane, attacking the homes of the Bengali community. The worst and commonest attacks took place around side streets, and on estates further east where Bengalis were a minority. The violence was related both to the presence and propaganda of the fascist groups and also to the racial polemic of politicians. Thus Enoch Powell's rivers of blood speech, delivered on Hitler's birthday 20 April 1968, was followed by the first outbreak of 'Paki-bashing' in East London. Similarly, Margaret Thatcher's remarks on Granada TV in 1978 on 'swamping of cultures' provoked an increase of racial attacks.
Major national figures and papers like the Daily Mail and Telegraph had created a climate in which racism was respectable.
Again it was the victims who were blamed. The National Front continued to sell inflammatory material for 2 years in Bethnal Green road and anti-racists who protested non-violently were accused of a beach of the peace.
Bradford 1981
In 1981, the Bradford 12, a group of young Asians were charged with petrol bombs for self-defence and finally acquitted. Ken Leech was a witness at the trial at Leeds Crown Court, as two of the defendants were known to me. One of the accused said at the trial:
"My personal experience is that the police never defended our community. there is a lack of will to help... The police have always protected the fascists. May be you don't know what it is to be black in a racist society. The only thing you can think of is the measures you might take to defend yourself."
Shortly before the trial, the Home Office study, Racial Attacks, had appeared, showing that Asians are 50 times more likely tp be racially attacked than whites. And yet Detective Inspector Sidebottom when questioned said he had never heard of the report and was not aware of any high incidence of attacks in the Bradford area.
In Bradford as in other areas, attacks were most concentrated on estates and streets where Asian and their families were isolated. There was the usual tendency to blame the victims rather than the attackers. Many Asians have given up informing the police, because when they have done so, they themselves have been interrogated about their immigration status. Local authorities tended to rehouse the victims of attack rather than remove the attackers.
Brixton and Liverpool 1981
The first disturbances in Brixton began over the weekend of 10-12 April 1981, and were followed in July by a series of similar disturbances in 12 cities and towns, especially Liverpool. In London, these included Dalston, Stoke Newington, Clapham, Houslow and Acton. Here these were not race riots - riots between races. Rather the conflict was with police as symbols of white authority, with state racism and criminalisation of black communities. The black community in Liverpool is not an immigrant community. It has been there for over 100 years and its historic roots are in Africa, not Asia or the Caribbean.
Liverpool 8 (Toxteth) had been 'Subjected to many sociological studies. the Bishop of Liverpool described it as 'The most surveyed distirct of Britain'. Six volumes of a government survey were devoted to conditions of Toxteth, along with Small Heath (Birmingham) and Lambeth (part of Brixton). But if ministers were relying on the reports of police officers, the reality caught them by surprise. Promptly the police, politicians and the media trotted out the usual rightwing explanations - the disturbances were not about unemployment or deprivation but the work of criminals and hooligans. Prime Minister Thatcher said in the House of Commons on 9th July 1981: "I agree with the Daily Mirror that the violence in Liverpool had nothing to do with pay, housing and unemployment but a 'spree of naked greed'"
Thus began (with politicians and the tabloids) the tradition of ignoring the systemic causes of urban conflict and focusing on criminality.
The Daily Mirror, for example, described Winston Silcott (sentenced as a result of the Broadwater Farm disrubances) as 'full of malice and hate', as having 'evil in his heart' and denied that deprivation was relevant. the police tended to use the language of 'law and order' to disguise a fundamentally racist position. Home Secretary Douglas Hurd described the events as ' completely without reason, not a cry for help but a cry for loot'.
Likewise, most blacks in Brixton are not immigrants. There had been a build-up of anger among the black communities in South London since the terrible fire in New Cross on 18 January 1981 when 13 young blacks died. It was not until 24 February that a message of sympathy came from the Prime Minister, sent not to the parents but a local community worker. No message from the Queen. The way the inquiry and inquest were handled had created the feeling that society didn't care for black people. Side by side was growing anxiety was the Nationality Bill 1981 and fears they might lose their status as British citizens.
then there was 'sus' - the suspicion clause which was used largely against young blacks. There was also the use of Section 4 of the Vagrancy Act 1824. Around half of those arrested under this section were black people. While the 'sus' offence has been abolished, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act didn't help. Passport raids and checks as a result of the Immigration Act 1971 were used mainly against the Asians.
The riots were about wider issues of poverty, unemployment and deprived neighbourhoods. Ironically, these were among the most researched areas. But the powerful were simply not listening until the riots erupted. The Michael Heseltine rushed to Merseyside and money was made available. A few days of rioting had achieved what years of many volumes of research had not.
The Brixton Council of Churches got it right. It said the disturbances were 'an outburst of anger directed at the police. It seems the police can never allow itself to take advice, let alone the faintest hint of criticism.' The London Churches Group complained in 1981 that had been 'persistently snubbed' by Scotland Yard for three years. A white woman, former chair of a police authority had said: "Young people from ethnic minorities fear the police. This fear springs from experience: they are often stopped in the streets to be questioned or searched. Many are racially abused, some are beaten in police custody while others are criminlaised on the perjured evidence of policemen..."
Handsworth 1985
While Brixton was investigated by Lord Scarman, the
Handsworth inquiry led to the Silverman Report.
Scarman Report
In the aftermath of the riots, the Home Office asked Lord
Scarman to investigate - focusing mainly on policing aspects. Scarman refused to
be restricted. His report consisted of 124 pages - 91 about the police, 22 about
social conditions.
The report was not particularly original. It seems to have been modelled on the report of the Kerner Commission, The National Commission on Civil Disorders (1968), set up by President Johnson following the disturbances in the US in 1967. Those disorders too were directed against the police. Kerner described "police practices as involving police-citizen contacts initiated by police rather than in response to a cal for help or service. A roving task force moves into high crime districts without prior notice and conducts intensive, often indiscriminate, street stops and searches." The report wrote of a 'clear pattern of social disadvantage' and 'severely disadvantaged social and economic conditions'. The only thing really new about the Scarman report was the date!
1) Scarman ignored the long-term context of the disturbances - the decline and decay of the inner-city districts. Conditions that led to the riots at Notting Hill, Brixton, Toxteth and Moss Side have remained virtually unchanged.
2) Racism (to the white elite investigators) is seen in terms of 'feelings of rejection' or 'alienation', rather than a concrete reality condoned the state. The Silverman Report on the Handsworth disturbances (1985) used Scarman as a model. Silverman wrote: "Racial discrimination and the feeling of being discriminated is part of the social background of Handsworth. The alienation felt by ethnic minorities is an essential element in the case of the riots..."
Feelings are important but racism is not simply about how people feel about reality. What matters is that they are being discriminated against. Yet Scarman denied the existence of institutional racism.
3) Police racism is played down: the report speaks of 'occasional' manifestations by a 'few officers'. The report there ignored the main cause of the riots.
4) the crucial issue of accountability is bypassed. Are the police to be subject to democratic control for their actions or are chief constables are to be regarded as infallible?
At the end of Kerner Report, the authors worry that their recommendations may be shelved. So they included a quotation from the reputed black activist Dr Kenneth Clarke who had said of earlier reports:
"The read the report of the 1919 riot in Chicago, and it is as if I were reading the report on the Harlem riot of 1935, or the report of the Harlem riot of '43 or that of the Watts riot. We see the same analysis, the same recommendations - and the same inaction."